Abstract. In this paper we present the results of detailed case-study work on two important music production centres: Stockholm (Sweden) and Kingston (Jamaica). It is shown that both are dynamic innovation and production centres for populate music. In both cases local characteristics of the organisational and firm structure in the industry are claimed to be crucial for understanding innovation processes and the competitiveness of the resulting products. However, it is shown that considerable differences exist between the two centres in terms of the profits and returns (both monetary and otherwise) on global competitiveness and success made both by local actors and by the local production system. It is suggested that two crucial areas explain these unequal returns to commercially successful creativity: interfirm and intrafirm links between the local and global; and the effectiveness of intellectual property regimes. It is suggested that work on cultural-products industries must attempt to understand not only the processes from which commercial innovation arises and in which it is embedded, but also the processes and mechanisms by which appropriate levels of returns on creativity can be secured by the local production centre.
Introduction
The popular-music industry has in the last fifty years grown to become an important global industry and a major area of economic activityöone that operates on a variety of intersecting geographical scales. The music industry is, most often, a highly localised cultural-product industry that draws on local creative milieux and cultural forms, and has a tendency to agglomerate in urban areas (Hesmondhalgh, 1996; Scott, 1999a; 1999b; . However, the business of producing, selling, and consuming music is globally dominated by an increasingly concentrated manufacturing and distribution system dominated by a shrinking number of global media`majors' (Alexander, 1996; Burnett, 1996; Choi, 1999; Firth, 1992; Hirsch, 1992; Malm and Wallis, 1992; Sadler, 1997; Shapiro et al, 1992; Wallis and Malm, 1984) . Although many places in the world are home to dynamically creative cultural and musical milieux, it is interesting to note that in the history of popular music relatively few have fostered groups or`scenes' that have gone on to international or global success, whether this be measured in terms of profits or cultural influence (though in this paper we focus on financial success or gain). It is argued in this paper that in the music industry it is not only the quality of the creative milieux that counts towards commercial success but also the links between the local production system and international circuits of capital, distribution, and effective property rights.
This argument is tested here with two of the world's most dynamic and creative musical agglomerations: Stockholm, Sweden, and Kingston, Jamaica. Stockholm is the centre of the highly centralised or agglomerated Swedish music-production system (Almquist et al, 1999; Forss, 1999; Hallencreutz and Lundequist, 2002; Hallencreutz et al, 2000; Jansson, 2000; Johansson, 2000; Power, 2002; Statens Kulturra® d, 1998; which after the United States and the United Kingdom is the largest net exporter of popular music products (Burnett, 1997) , having produced a remarkable number of internationally successful musical acts öincluding amongst others Abba, Ace of Base, the Cardigans, Neneh Cherry, Europe, Stina Nordenstam, and Roxette. Just as in Sweden, the Jamaican music-production system is almost entirely dominated by the capital city. Fuelled by the worldwide popularity of ska and reggae music from the 1970s onwards, Kingston has been the creative centre for some of the world's most important and commercially successful popular-music recording artistes ö including Bob Marley and the Wailers, Lee Scratch Perry, Desmond Dekker and the Aces, Jimmy Cliff, Gregory Isaacs, Peter Tosh, Shabba Ranks, and Shaggy. Although not comparable in terms of socioeconomic conditions, and of course climate, both cities are directly comparable when taken seriously as world-class leading-edge centres for the production of popular music products. The choice of these two cases for comparison then rests upon the recognition of the world-class position of both cities in the production of music products. This choice is further validated, we believe, by the fact that this assessment rests to a large extent on the international and export competitiveness of their respective products: in short they are strong competitors in the same global market. The fact that both of the music-production milieux treated here are embedded in relatively small economies, albeit radically different ones, makes the international competitiveness and export of their products more important than they may be for artistes and firms in larger economies where domestic demand is large enough to support a profitable and fully functioning industry that need not necessarily look outside its borders in order to be viable (one may think here of countries such as Brazil, India, or China that have highly productive and profitable music industries despite the fact that the products are not significantly exported to or consumed in international markets). These considerations, we believe, make the two cases more amenable and interesting for comparison than they may first appear.
What is particular interesting, however, when comparing the two is that, although Kingston's products have a far higher global commercial value than those from Stockholm, it is Stockholm's local production system and urban economy that make the bigger profit in real terms. The United Nations Commission on Trade and Development calculated the recorded music product [excluding live performances and related merchandise, and excluding the domestic Jamaican marketöworth less than US$2 million in retail sales in 1994 and US$2.2 million in 2000 (IFPI, 2001a) ] of Jamaica, in the main reggae music, to have had a worldwide wholesale value of at least US$1.2 billion in 1994 (Kozul-Wright and Stanbury, 1998 ; see also Bourne and Allgrove, 1995; PIOJ, 1997; Watson, 1995) , whilst exports of recorded music from Jamaica itself totalled a relatively miniscule US$291000 (Bourne and Allgrove, 1995) . Although the total worldwide wholesale value should not be treated as exports from Jamaica owing to the fact that many successful Jamaican artistes record and produce most of their work in North America and Europe, it is clear that there exists a very large imbalance between what is happening and what could happen, and that even a relatively small increase in the Jamaican export of music would greatly add to an economy whose total value of exports in 1995 was US$1.4 billion. In stark contrast, the Swedish case is one where export and domestic market success have led to significant benefits to the national music industry and its Stockholm heartland; Swedish net exports of recorded music in 1997 (the year for which the only data comparable with the Jamaican figures above exist) were around US$411 million (SKr3368 million) (see also Forss, 1999; . Although these are quite rough measures of value, what they illustrate is that, despite a proven market of at least US$1.2 billion for`Jamaican' music outside the country, only a tiny percentage trickles back to the`producing' country.
Bearing the above in mind, we explore in this paper the unique bases upon which the strong competitive position of each centre rest and the dynamics by which this competitiveness is translated into vastly differential rewards for the respective local systems and economies. Underlying the work in this paper is the argument that analyses in economic geography of the benefits of agglomeration, clustering, and localised conditions, and so on must also take into account the wider mechanisms by which individuals and firms profit from creativity. Furthermore we provide a contribution to the growing literature on the regional and agglomerated basis of competitiveness in the music industry (see, for instance: Hallencreutz and Lundequist, 2002; Hallencreutz et al, 2000; Hesmondhalgh, 1997; Scott, 1999a ) and the`cultural industries' in general (Dziembowska-Kowalska and Funck, 1999; Greffe, 1997; Hirsch, 1972; Kong, 2000a; Lindeborg, 1993; NUTEK, 1994; Power, 2002; Pratt, 1997a; 1997b; Scott, 1996; 1999a; UNESCO, 1982) . Few studies have attempted to study the returns to creativity and innovation arising from globally competitive culturalproducts centres, with far too many studies concentrating on the genesis of creativity rather than on the dynamics of the larger value chain. Indeed one might say that, in general, studies of the competitiveness of bounded or agglomerated production systems often focus primarily on the dynamics and mechanisms of developing creativity and innovation and pay relatively scant attention to the reasons behind differential rates of return accruing to areas with similarly competitive capacities. Furthermore, few studies tackle such issues in a comparative context, not least between centres embedded iǹ advanced' and`developing' economies.
In this paper we draw special attention to the crucial roles of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes and attendant industrial and firm structure for the`profitability' of music. Underlying the whole paper is the recognition that copyrights and IPR are the constitutive institutions upon which the present configurations of the music industry rest (compare Dolfsma, 2000) .`T he recording industry is a talent-driven, creative industry, and as such it is totally dependent on copyright protection. Copyright is the essential building block of the music business, allowing artists, song writers and record companies to invest their revenues and their livelihoods in the creative process, secure in the knowledge that they, and no one else, will own the result. Copyright is the incentive to be creative. It protects artists from piracy of their works and it nurtures new talent'' [website of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industries (IFPI) http://www.ifpi.org December, 2001] . In recent years a series of technological innovationsösuch as Internet-based file sharing, compressed file formats (for example, MP3), and CD burnersöhave threatened the effective protection and collection of copyright revenues from music (Barbrook, 1999; Dolfsma, 2000; IFPI, 2001b; Kasaras, 2002; Leyshon, 2001; Pfahl, 2001) . To an extent the case of Kingston presented below can be seen as a model of a post-MP3 musical economy where the lack of an enforceable or effective IPR regime configures the music industry and economy in a manner antithetical to the large-firm-dominated model that is common in much of the rest of the world. As we shall see, the absence of an institutional structure to protect copyright and collect royalties, etc has meant that Jamaican`investments' and`product development' have not been protected. This has resulted in actors and firms being forced to turn over their cultural and financial capital as quickly as possible, resulting in a fragmented industrial structure characterised by underinvestment (financially at least) and cut-throat competition. Stockholm, by contrast, can be seen as an example of a musical economy centrally located in the present capitalist IPR regime: an economy where musical products are defended by a strong local regime that allows long-term investments in creative acts to be returned. The two cases therefore serve to illustrate that both the present political economy of place, where different positions within the global economy confer vastly different rewards, and differences in, and the erosion of, the efficiency of IPR regimes can have dramatic effects on industrial and profit structures for cultural-products industries.
We first outline some theoretical and methodological considerations and then move on to examine the cases: first, Stockholm; second, Kingston. We conclude by reaffirming the often-noted positive correlation between agglomeration and economic and creative innovation but add that rates of return to agglomerated economic activity and innovation vary considerably owing to a variety of factors. It is concluded that in these two cases differential levels of profit repatriation can be explained by two main factors: copyright regime and administration on the one hand, and industrial and firm structure on the other.
Cultural industries and music-production systems
The approach taken by us in this paper draws on and attempts to contribute to the growing body of literature dealing with the cultural industries or cultural-products industries (compare Power, 2002) . Although much of interest has been written about the links between, for instance, cultural activity and economic redevelopment (Bassett, 1993; Bianchini, 1993; CLES, 1988; Dziembowska-Kowalska and Funck, 1999; Frith, 1991; Kearns and Philo, 1993; Kong, 2000a; Kunzmann, 1997; Landry and Bianchini, 1995; O'Connor, 1998; Watson, 1991; Williams, 1997; Wynne, 1992) or the effect of mass media on mass culture (Adorno, 1991) , relatively little rigorous research has been conducted that treats in detail cultural industries as an integrated industrial sector, system, or cluster. Therefore, there now exists a lacuna in systematic studies of the industry and its sectors (DiMaggio, 1977; Pratt, 1997a; 1997b; Sadler, 1997; Scott, 2000a) . Although the music industry has been better attended to than other culturalproducts industries, when the volume of literature on more`traditional' industries is compared with that on the music industry it is clear to see that there remains a need in relation to music to take approaches that reflect the view that:``an economic orientation to cultural policy is now needed: cultural industries as industrial strategy'' (Pratt, 1997b; page 1914) . The phenomenal growth of the global market for recorded music ö estimated at being worth US $37 billion in sales in 2000 (IFPI, 2001a) ömakes an industrial perspective even more pressing.
Viewing the production of cultural products from an industrial perspective is not new (see, for instance, Becker, 1974; Bjo« rkegren, 1992; Girard, 1982; Hirsch, 1972; Kibbe, 1982; Pratt, 1997a; 1997b; Scott, 1999b; . Working with a stress on the economic actors and actions involved in processes of cultural production has the benefit that it:`t akes the focus of attention away from any single firm or role in the sequence of discovering, producing, and delivering a product, redirecting attention to the interconnections and interdependencies between them in order to get to the final product or outcome'' (Hirsch, 2000, page 356 ). In addition the systemic environment and local milieux of firms can be important in fostering, and hindering, such things as learning, innovation, and knowledge-upgrading processes (see, for example, Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Maillat, 1995; Malmberg and Maskell, 1997; Marshall, 1920; Maskell et al, 1998; Porter, 1990) . Just as with other cultural-products industries, the music industry is one where spatial structure appears to have a direct bearing and constitutive role in processes of creativity and innovation as well as the resulting value chain (see, for instance, Leyshon, 2001 ; Leyshon et al, 1998; Scott, 1999a) . Understanding the systems of inputs, interconnections, and linkages, etc that go into producing a product is only a first step in understanding the entire industrial system through which products are produced and processed, and of course distributed and ultimately consumed. The value of such a perspective when dealing with a cultural industry, such as the music industry, is underlined by the fact that it is incredibly difficult to assign priority to any one step or aspect of a product in explaining its success. As Hennion (1989; see also Scott, 1999a notes, commercial success in popular music is impossible to explain by virtue of the original musical text alone. Rather the consumption of a cultural object is an indeterminate and subjective process with audiences consuming and understanding the same object in different ways and manners; likewise the production of music products involves a variety of inputs and agents all of which are intrinsic parts of the creative process, which must be understood as essentially rooted in an industry-based commercial logic that is often highly spatialised (compare Firth, 1992; Hallencreutz and Lundequist, 2002; Hallencreutz et al, 2000; Leyshon et al, 1998; Negus, 1999; Scott, 1999a) .
Taking an industrial-systems approach that concentrates on commercially produced and distributed popular music is further justified by virtue of the nature of the subject. Although as a concept`popular music' is``riddled with complexities'' (Middleton, 1990 , page 3) and encompasses a wide variety of musical formsöincluding dance, folk, heavy metal, pop, rap, reggae, rock, and soulöthe concept is relatively coherent in that it includes musical forms that are recorded, produced, and distributed to a mass market on a commercial basis. The focus for this study then is on types of popular music most often funded by private finance rather than public funds; public funding tends to dominate classical music, opera, and, to a lesser extent, jazz (Burnett, 1996, page 37) .
The examination of the case studies was based largely upon qualitative fieldwork involving semistructured and unstructured interviewing of industry participants and concentrated on recorded music (as opposed to live performance, etc). In the case of Stockholm we draw on research undertaken as part of a broader project on the popular-music industry and the cultural industries in Sweden (compare Hallencreutz and Lundequist, 2002; Hallencreutz et al, 2000; Power, 2002) and in particular on seventy-six interviews with music-sector firms and industry organisations carried out during 1999 and 2000. Material relating to the Kingston case was primarily gathered (by Tommy Bergösee Berg, 2001 ) during a three-month study period in Kingston during 2000. Fieldwork was, again, conducted with qualitative research methods and involved the extensive interviewing of music-industry actors: studios, producers, manufacturers, retailers, local distributors, and record labels. Interviews were carried out with actors both from the formalised firm-based section of the Jamaican music industry and also from the sizable informal economy that revolves around music in Kingston, such as street vendors and pirate copiers. In both cases a variety of literature, such as professional journals (for example, Musikindustrin and Billboard ) and artistes biographies or autobiographies, was used as well as statistical material obtained from statistical agencies (SCB Statistiska Centralbyra® nöStatistics Swedenöand The Statistical Institute of Jamaica), national and international industry bodies, and business registers.
Stockholm
Despite talk by many music journalists of the existence of a distinctive Scandinavian sound, exemplified by the likes of the Cardigans and Stina Nordenstam, the strength of the Swedish music scene seems to lie in producing Anglo-American music that is often better than the`real thing'. By singing in English and fitting into well-established rock, pop, and dance genres many Swedish artistes have produced products easily palatable to international markets and have enjoyed considerable commercial success. In common with many sectors of the country's economy, the Swedish music industry is highly centred in the region with 1.5 million people that makes up the Swedish capital and, specifically, in the central city area of Stockholm stad (Almquist et al, 1999; Forss, 1999; Hallencreutz and Lundequist, 2002; Hallencreutz et al, 2000; Jansson, 2000; Johanssson, 2000; Power, 2002; Statens Kulturra® d, 1998; .
Though Stockholm is by no means the most predominant source of music talent in Swedenömany of the most famous bands originate from other cities: for example, the Cardigans from Jo« nko« ping; Jennifer Brown and Ace of Base from Go« teborgöit is the place where most artistes and industry workers pursue their professional careers or progress to the next level (compare Denisoff and Bridges, 1982) . According to the most recent estimates available, there are at least 3000 professional musicians, composers, and producers in Sweden, with most operating as freelancers (Forss, 1999) . Along with a far higher number of amateur musicians, these professionals constitute the basis for the speciality inputsöin the form of music creationöto the music industry. Thesè creators' tend to`end up' in the Stockholm region with smaller but significant numbers in Go« teborg and Malmo« (the other two major urban areas). It is interesting to note, though, that a great many of these were not born in the Stockholm region. Thus, Stockholm's industry relies heavily on`competence-input' from other regions in Sweden.
These`creators' both attract firms to and are drawn in by Stockholm's position as the centre of the industrial system of music production and sales in Sweden. The region has a large number of local and international music companies: around 200 record companies and approximately 70 music-publishing companies öaround 50% of the national total. The most immediately apparent aspect of the firm structure of the city is the extent of its internationalisation; or its exposure to the global majors. All thè majors' in the global recorded-music industry are active in Sweden through fully owned subsidiaries headquartered in Stockholm. Since the early 1980s these corporations have strengthened their positions by acquiring most of the large independent companies (such as Metronome, Elektra, Sonet, and Polar). When acquiring these companies, the corporations also incorporated their licensing deals and facilities for distribution, as well as affiliated publishing companies. The ten largest record companies (by turnover) in Sweden are now all owned by foreign majors and are all headquartered within walking distance of one another in central Stockholm. Thus the global majors have to a large extent acquired all the central elements of Stockholm's, and Sweden's, record-production and music-publishing system. One such example is the AOL Time Warner tree presented in figure 1 which demonstrates the global^local linkages common both to Stockholm and to elsewhere. However, research revealed that the local subsidiaries often operate quite autonomously when it comes to Swedish products and projects. Rather than simply following orders from the head office, actors were seen to display high levels of intrafirm or conglomerate entrepreneurship and often attempted to use the global marketing organisation of their parent company to export music produced and recorded in Stockholm (and elsewhere). Furthermore, there is evidence of continuous formation of new firms, manifested by a growing number of independent record companies, publishing companies, production companies, etc. Strong local dynamism and entrepreneurship seem, in this case, to go hand in hand with dominant foreign ownership.
Parallel to this concentration of ownership has been, since the early 1990s, the growth of small, independent, flexible full-service publishing and production companies in Sweden, most notably in the Stockholm region (for example, Cheiron, Murlyn Music, Sprinkler, Maratone). A key example amongst these was the firm Cheiron, which quickly became a world-renowned centre for the writing and production of pop and rock music. The firm has now broken up (after the untimely death of one of its founding members) but was in essence a collective group of producers who operated a studio in Stockholm aimed at producing global hits: the surviving members have remained very active in the industry. The group was remarkably successful in producing both successful Swedish acts (such as Ace of Base, Robyn, and Papa Dee) and international artists (such as The Backstreet Boys, Britney Spears, Bon Jovi, Celine Dion, and N'Sync). There is little doubt that Cheiron and others have been powerful role models to the city's music industry in general and have created a widespread awareness of the success to be had from business areas other than the fostering of new artistes, which most people think of as the core element of a successful music industry. Equally it is only one example of a large number of firms that have functioned as incubation units for new firms and spin-offs. During the firm's lifetime, and in particular after its break up, numerous new firms were formed that built on expertise and contact networks formed by one-time members of the firm [for a more detailed account of key actors and career paths see Hallencreutz (2002) ]. Evidence shows that throughout the 1990s and today continuous new firm formation has been a feature of the city's scene, and there has been significant growth in the number of independent record companies, professional musicians, publishing companies, production companies, and music-related IT companies [see Power (2002) Forss (1999, page 107) estimated that sales of music services to foreign clients accounted for just over 12% of Swedish music exports. This has, according to local artistes, strengthened the creative`buzz' in the city and given many artistes further reasons for staying in the city rather than leaving for global centres such as London or New York. At the same time, artistes interviewed suggested that studio time is becoming increasingly expensive and thus has negative effects on the ability of newcomers to create high-quality`demos'. The existence of an open creative milieu and the growth of specialised service firms fits well with the practice in the recorded-music industry of subcontracting out, often internationally, as many functions as possible. It would be wrong to say, however, that the smaller Swedish firms are in constant conflict with the foreign majors and their branches or affiliates. Rather it appears that many synergies exist between the different types of firms and these are often cemented through the numerous examples of formal`buyer^supplier' linkages found, particularly different types of project-based, socially embedded linkages. Furthermore, there exist a number of shared business-related local institutions and evidence of informal cooperative competition, for example, various collaborative practices such as joint projects at international fairs (for example, Midem and Popkomm) and lobbying for standards in copyright law. In general, research suggests that the success of the independent production and postproduction firms in Stockholm and the degree of formal and project-based linkages between major and minor actors has had several specific effects: it has greatly enhanced the exposure of domestic artistes and firms and their access to international best practice; it has led to increased investment in the quality and capacity of the technical infrastructure and know how of the firms; and it has solidified associations between`Stockholm' and`quality product' in the minds and operations of European and global industry actors and firms.
An important consideration for understanding the general evolution of Sweden's commercial music industry is that a very supportive consumer base exists: domestic demand is very high with a domestic retail market worth around US$322.9 million in 2000 (IFPI Swedish group, see http://www.ifpi.se) and with Swedes ranking as the sixth highest per capita consumers of recorded music (IFPI, 2001a; Lilliestam, 1998) . A sizeable proportion of sales are of Swedish artistes (27% of sales in 1998; see http://www.ifpi.se) suggesting awareness of local producers and indicating a high level of quality in the domestic product. This is backed up by industry sources who stated that the Swedish consumers are considered to be highly`sophisticated' (see Porter, 1990) , having in the past proved themselves to be very early adaptors to changes in musical styles and trends as well as technologies. Sources in Stockholmbased branches of the majors said that the Swedish market was used as a testing ground for new products and groups, and that success in the market was often considered an important step in the development of the firms' wider European-level sales strategies. Furthermore, Swedes have long been amongst the first users of new technologies (for example, Sweden was one of the first countries to adopt the CD format as the standard) and have some of the highest levels of internet penetration (Eurostat, 2001 ) and commercial ICT (information and communication technology) usage (OECD, 2000) in the world, which has meant that the new technological possibilities shaping music distribution (and piracy) have gained rapid ground. Added to this, Stockholm youth's high levels of disposable income support a highly profitable, competitive, and dynamic music and club (both nightclubs and fan clubs) scene that interviews revealed to be important to the showcasing of local and national talent. A&R (Artists and Repertoireöthe traditional industry term for`talent scouting') executives spoken to said that the strength and diversity of the relatively compact local scene greatly helped in spotting talent; though one admitted that the concentration of the A&R world on central Stockholm may be detrimental to the chances of artistes who do not perform there.
Servicing this demand is a large number of retailers, most of which are parts of larger chains or subsections of extensive retail operations such as department-store chains. These retailers most usually source their product through a relatively centralised national distribution system located in the Stockholm region and dominated by the Association of Gramophone Suppliers (GLF) and its ten members öthe majors, their subsidiaries, and MNW (MusikNa« tet Waxholm) Records Groupöand their database and ordering system Grammotex.
The city's industry is further supported by a high level of technological ability and infrastructure. The existence of the latest facilities for the completion of a project from creation to saleable product has been an important factor in keeping the largest possible part of the value chain and profits of musical products in the country and city. As will be seen in the case of Kingston, it is quite common for the musical exports of smaller centres and countries to consist of only the core idea or track which is then sent abroad for postproduction, pressing, marketing, distribution, etc. Because the largest majority of the profits are to be gained at these later stages it is important for a centre to have the capacity to do as much as possible`in house'. Stockholm as a city has one of the most advanced media technology and telecommunications infrastructures in the world and can handle all aspects of the production chain. For instance, despite having a small domestic market, Sweden exhibits a high density of CD-pressing plants compared with other countries [Forss (1999, page 99) estimated the export value of physical recorded media`pressed' in SwedenöCDs, tapes, records, etcöto have been worth SKr1483 million out of total musical exports of SKr3368 million]. The majority of these plants are located in the greater Stockholm area along with various producers of CD-pressing technology, musical instruments, studio equipment, etc. Being close to or part of an advanced-technology environment has also fostered the growth of a relatively large number of companies on the interface between the music industry and Internet content and distribution companies.
Perhaps the most important factor in securing the`repatriation' of profits in an export-oriented cultural-products industry is the existence of an effective system for the protection of intellectual property. Without such a system the profits of creativity have a tendency to disappear very quickly. By virtue of a long history of artisan organisations and unions the music industry is well tended by representative organisations and collecting agencies (see table 1 ). The domestic presence and international surveillance and enforcement mechanisms of many of these organisations, combined with the Swedish state's active international protection of Swedish intellectual property, are important in minimising as much as possible the loss of export revenue within the chaotic maze of international music licensing and consumption, and to a lesser extent to piracy. Furthermore the domination of the majors in the export of Swedish music products and services has meant that Swedish products have enjoyed the majors' extensive powers to protect IPR globally: the majors are the only actors with the resources and manpower to protect (or exploit) copyright worldwide.
All in all, Stockholm seems to be a clear-cut case that industrial competitiveness often develops in a clustered or agglomerated manner; that is, it takes a large number of firms that are both competing and cooperating with each other to trigger growth. The industrial and organisational structure of Stockholm's music industry is at once both highly competitive and highly cooperative and is characterised by a diversity of actors and firms with a relatively high turnover. The pace of structural, organisational, and technical change in the city's industry has been high, and it would seem as though these changes have benefited the exports of Swedish musical products. For us, however, the feature of the Stockholm scene most supportive of export performance is the dense network of interorganisational linkages, voluntary associations, and service organisations that secure both relatively open export and distribution channels and also copyright (and thus indirectly revenues back to the creative milieu). The music business, or rather the actorsöbe they firms or individual artistes, composers, music teachers, publishers, or any other professional groupöappear to have a high capacity for self-organisation; that is, to create mechanisms for the coordination and promotion of joint interests, to exchange information and to take collective action. The Stockholm music`cluster' could be defined as a`world of production' (Storper and Salais, 1997) , embedded in the wider global music industry and characterised by a complex mixture of cooperation and competition. The quality and manner of intrafirm and interfirm linkages and relationships can be said to have added both to the success of Swedish products in wider markets and also to the protection of export earnings involved in Stockholm's role as a major international production and music-related-services centre. The perhaps surprising conclusionögiven the current strength of antiglobalisation rhetoricöis that it seems that higher or increasing levels of integration into the wider global music industry (and its concentrated power structures) have in fact added to the competitiveness and, crucially, the profitability of the local production system of the city's music industry. 
Kingston
Kingston currently performs the function of being something of a`neo-Marshallian node' (Amin and Thrift, 1992) in the global music industry. It is at once the production and innovation centre for a small but complex and dynamic domestic music market, as well as being a strong global supplier both of music product and of innovation [from music techniques such as those used in dub to entire stylistic genres such as ska, reggae, dancehall, and ragga (see Berg, 2001; Chang and Chen, 1998; Davis and Simon, 1992; Foster, 1999; Harris, 1984; Jahn and Weber, 1998; Potash, 1997; Saakana, 1980) ]. From its initial commercialisation in the early 1960s onwards, Jamaican music has evolved to have both a strong market presence and a relatively cohesive identity. Right from the start Kingston has been the creative heart of the entire country. From the marginalised West-end ghettos of the city, such as Trench Town and Jones Town (see Chang and Chen, 1998; Howard and Clarke, 1999) , musical styles such as ska and reggae broke forth, as well as their principal proponents such as Bob Marley. In recent years Bob Marley has gained what amounts to iconic status in Western popular culture (Hussey and Whitney, 1999; Stephens, 1998) and all the commercial possibilities that brings with it. Although often associated with Rastafarian culture and the various Rastafarian reggae superstars, Jamaican music is, especially today, far from only Rasta-embedded reggae. Jamaican music encompasses a variety of musical and cultural styles and formsöprincipally dance hall, dub, fusion, mento, nyabinghi, ska, ragga, reggae, and rock steadyöand when one visits Kingston today it is hard not to notice the outward signs of a varied and dynamic home-grown music scene: from blaring`sound systems' to street vendors selling recently released music. When one goes beyond this surface level it quickly becomes obvious that the city has a dynamic agglomeration of music and related products and services that is characterised by extreme competition at all stages in the value chain; this leads to a set of stylistic and commercial pressures driving fast-moving innovation cycles. The most interesting feature from a comparative perspective of Kingston as a music-production centre is that, unlike almost all other centres in the world, the Kingston case is one where the global majors have almost no direct presence or role. The organisational and firm structure of the city's industry is largely fragmented and overwhelmingly dominated by small-scale A&R and original-creation-driven firms. Although there are currently no representatives of the global majors in Jamaica, attempts have been made in the past by the predecessors of the modern corporations to set up in Kingston. The first such attempt was made in 1976 by CBS (now part of Sony Music) who wanted a Kingston base from which to supply the then rapidly expanding international reggae market. Local record firms and industry actors, however, successfully blocked the move by appealing to the then Prime Minister Michael Manley's strongly nationalistic and isolationist prejudices. Manley's departure in the violent elections of 1980 and the arrival of the more liberal Edward Seaga (who had at one point set up a record company himself) into office prompted CBS to make another attempt. This time they attempted to buy one of the larger local record firms, Dynamic Sounds, with the aim of turning it into a mini transnational corporation (TNC) covering the entire Caribbean area. However, the deal was eventually stopped by strict laws against TNC holdings in domestic firms.
CBS's attempts seemed to have acted as a warning to other foreign corporations and none have since tried to establish themselves on the island. The global majors have shied away from direct involvement, preferring instead to`cherry pick' already-developed products. This is widely acknowledged by industry actors interviewed in Kingston to have in the past been a rather dubious, and often exploitative or even criminal, process with the majors buying complete master tapes and exclusive rights off whoever could get their hands on them. A case in point is the fate of some early Marley recordings produced by Clement`Coxsone' Dodd who found out that Columbia Records bought the tapes and licenses, from which they made the best selling Birth of a Legend album, from a wellknown Kingston racketeer and gangster (see also Jahn and Weber, 1998) . The lack of an adequate copyright environment (discussed below) and the lack of any direct involvement of the majors in the island meant that the vast majority of pre-1990s recordings and rights have been entirely appropriated by the global majors with little or no revenue finding its way back to the original artistes or producers: this is especially important as in`advanced' economies the highest margins are made from`back catalogue' sales.
Links between foreign firms and local firms and artistes have been, and are, put under further strain by cultural differences that have led to an extreme unwillingness on the part of the majors to have dealings with local firms. Industry sources suggested that many local actors have an aggressive`get rich quick' approach (see also Kozul-Wright and Stanbury, 1998 ) that makes them unwilling to enter the sort of long-term legal and financial arrangements the big corporate players demand: in markets such as the United States and Europe it takes a long time and large capital investments to launch, warehouse, and distribute products and in addition to this the majors tend to release products over a long period to avoid overexposure of the type that may bore consumers. Stories abound in the majors also of the extreme difficulties of working with the often temperamental natures of those Kingston artistes and firms. This has earned Jamaicans a reputation of being hard to work with which has further accentuated the unwillingness to invest in Jamaican artistes and projects (though one would imagine international record companies should be well used to most types of`unconventional' and`unruly' behaviour by now).
Despite the lack of direct involvement by the majors it is important to note that foreign firms have in many respects been the most important actors in the history of Jamaican music and its international success. Probably the most important lead firm in the development of Kingston's music industry has been Island Records (bought by Polygram in 1998 and now the Island Def Jam Music Group, a subdivision of Vivendi Universal Group) originally set up and owned by the English-born Chris Blackwell. Blackwell, who spent some of his early years in Jamaica, was largely responsible for the rise to superstardom of Bob Marley who, rather appropriately in the context of this paper, first met Blackwell in 1972 in London where Marley was taking refuge after having being stranded in Sweden after a tour with Johnny Nash. Island Records and Blackwell were instrumental in bringing the music of Jamaica first to Britain and then to the world (Chang and Chen, 1998; Cimino, 1992; Salewicz and Boot, 2001) . Despite the lead role and success of foreign companies like Island and Columbia in selling large quantities of Jamaican music globally, the fact remains that these lead actors have only a very limited presence at the local level and have, as mentioned above, tended to cherry pick already-developed products rather than invest in new lines.
The dynamism of Jamaican musical output then has largely been a story of endogenous growth in innovative activity. Exact figures on the number of firms and individuals involved in the production of music in Kingston are hard to come by owing to the lack of precise figures for the industry and the informal (often illegal) nature of many firms and individuals involved in the town's music industry. Furthermore, as discussed below, the tendency for actors to work through multiple labels and firms and simultaneously take up multiple roles (for example, producers who are also artistes, sound engineers, label owners, etc) makes it virtually impossible to disaggregate the components of the industry in a comparable fashion to that done above with the Stockholm case (where divisions of labour are much more rigid). Recently attempts have been made by the Jamaican government to set up databases (see, for instance, http://www.investjamaica.com) of those involved but at the time of writing these remain very partial and incomplete; official industrial data for the industry are also considered to be relatively incomplete and overly aggregated. What is certain, however, when one reviews histories of popular music, global recorded-music sales, and current international and Jamaican charts is that, at least in terms of professional artistes, a large number of acts ö around 2000 (either single artistes or groups) according to local estimates ö currently reside or have their origins in Kingston.
These acts are supported by a large number of independent, most often very smallscale, record companies and labels; such as Tuff Gong, Dynamics, Penthouse Records, Sonic Sounds, and Scorcher Music. A major feature of the system is that it is relatively unique in organisational form and differs from places like Stockholm where record companies, characterised by high degrees of internal transactions, are the central production units. Kingston is characterised by a complex mix of producers (in the music industry sense of the term), record companies, and record labels with high degrees of external transactions. In Kingston, and in reggae music, the`producers' are more prominent than in other places and genres and tend to control the industry by creating and owning the basic tracks or the underlying`riddims' (a special combination of a bassline, drum pattern, and an associated melody; similar to the soul and jazz concept of`grooves',`riddim' is a commonly used musicological concept in Jamaican music, and indeed rap, and is not to be simply confused with`rhythm'). The producer books the studio time (many own their own studios) and chooses from a never-ending stream of singers and DJs who want to record; in the hierarchy of the Kingston music industry the producer is on top and his (seldom her) name gets equal or greater attention than the artistes' name. Producers, record companies, and artistes often own multiple record labels which act both as stylistic identifiers and as`meeting points' for collaborative projects. The owners of`sound systems' öessentially large, mobile discotheques playing at dances, nightclubs, and house partiesöare major actors in the city's music-production system. They act not only as performance venues but also as A&R sites and production centres with some of the systems acting as`record labels' by recording and releasing the sessions onto the recorded-music market. However, the lack of dominant large record and professional management companies and the artistes' use of multiple sound systems, labels, and`producers' (who themselves have considerable power) support a system where informal contract types are the norm and it becomes very difficult to ascertain where the original creative content comes from and where ownership lies. (The rather unique organisational form also makes a meaningful visual mapping and identification of the industry near impossible.)
The complex and fragmented nature of the production system and the multiplicity of actors, most often working on an essentially freelance basis, can be seen to have strengthened the role of interpersonal and informal contacts in the innovation process. In order to survive in the city's industry, firms and individuals realise that constant social and business interaction is important. In contrast to the trust and cooperation that are often pointed to as central to the creative milieus of small firm clusters (compare Scott, 2000a) , in Kingston this interaction is predominantly competitive rather than cooperative. The diversity of small-scale firms who do not have the capabilities to develop products fully in-house means that the industry is characterised by high levels of external transactions which further embed actors in the system. High levels of external transactions and dense social interaction mean that information flows more fluidly than in many other music-production centres. This means that it is extremely hard to keep products under wraps before release and that new musical ideas and techniques rapidly diffuse (one day is not an uncommon time for new riddims to be widely copied by other artists and made available to the market).
Thus agglomeration (of musical activities) in the urban area fosters intensified transactions and interactions that are crucial to commercially successful creative and innovative product development. Furthermore the speed of transactions and information exchange have a definite effect on the way in which products are released. Whereas in European and US markets product release tends to be spaced out over time, in Kingston record companies pursue a policy of flooding the market in an attempt to sell as many records as possible in the shortest possible time. In Sweden popular artistes tend to release a single roughly every four months as a strategy of bringing long-term attention to the higher value products, the albums, which in turn are released often years apart. By contrast in Kingston is it is common for an artiste to release a new single within two weeks of a previously released single and it is the single format that is granted priority. This places great pressure on artistes and record companies to maintain extremely high productivity rates. Many interviewees considered this to have an often detrimental effect on quality and thus on the artistes' long-term futures; on the other hand, Kingston's consumers rarely put up with substandard products.
There may of course be considerable benefits accruing to musical innovation in an area with a fragmented firm structure. Some writers have noted that fragmentation and lack of concentration in the corporate organisation of recorded-music production may favour diversity in product type and encourage innovative processes (Alexander, 1996; Burnett, 1990; Christianen, 1995; Lopes, 1992; Peterson and Berger, 1975; Scott, 1999a) . However, the same writers also note that this process tends to be cyclical: corporate organisation changes as majors exploit diversity, leading to concentration; independents take advantage of niche markets leading to refragmentation. What is interesting about Kingston is that it has largely avoided the extremes of this cyclical process of corporate restructuring that countries such as the United States and indeed Sweden have had. Nevertheless, although the process of cycles of concentration and diversification have not been as stark in Kingston as elsewhere, the international production and distribution of Jamaican music has been subject to these pressures. For example, the period of Jamaican musical-product diversification engendered by new, Jamaica-focused and international-market-oriented foreign independents ösuch as the early days of Island Records and later the impact of the UK-based Blood and Fire labelöwas in turn followed by corporate concentration as the independents were bought up by the majors and product lines were refocused onto a narrower line of large-unit sellers (such as greatest-hits and compilation albums).
However, the level of fragmentation and often disorder in the structure and organisation has important negative consequences. One consequence is that the lack of links to international players and their distribution channels and resources has significantly underlined the lack of capital and financing sources for upgrading and investment in new products (successful launch of new records on an international level involves a substantial investment in stock, marketing, advance-shipping costs, etc that most Jamaican firms cannot finance). Interviews revealed that those studios that cannot afford to upgrade facilities to a decent modern level have moved away from serving the`serious' music community and shifted towards a focus on recording commercial jingles and the like for radio and television advertising. This has further reduced the production capacity of the industry and has channelled production and mixing expertise away from the quality music products upon which the long-term future of the industry rests. Firms' lack of resources to invest in advanced production and recording techniques and, crucially, information on market-demand conditions outside the country means that they rely on obsolete recording and production equipment which makes international-standard digital quality and format production impossible, which in turn closes off direct access to high-spending but quality-conscious foreign markets such as the United States and Japan. The lack of a capacity to supply modern digital-quality products is a major problem in an international context, especially so when it is remembered that, internationally, CDs account for around 75% of the overall market and almost 90% of the singles market (IFPI, 2001a) . The problem is not just one of funding, however, as fragmentation and lack of firm-level exposure to the wider global industry further distances Kingston's producers from foreign markets and the modern techniques they demand. Furthermore the lack of high-standard equipment and up-to-date techniques means that domestic postproduction, remixing, video production, and related services tend to get exported. It must be remembered that it is often in these later stages of the journey of music products to the market that added value is created and profits made, and as we saw in the case of Stockholm these types of services can draw in business from outside the country that is both profitable and beneficial to the dynamics of the local centre.
Thus firms must rely on the low-tech and impoverished domestic market. Demand in the domestic market for the CD format is extremely lowöprobably around 10% of unit sales (see IFPI, 2001a )öand sales of CDs almost entirely relate to foreign product. Insufficient local demand for CDs and digital quality and the relative poverty of the markets further hinder attitudes and abilities to upgrade: in 1999 the Jamaican music industry on the domestic market generated US$5.4 million, which leaves only seven countries that generate less (IFPI, 2000) . Interviews revealed that the average`hit' tends to sell between two and ten thousand vinyl copies normally priced at around US$2 per unit. Once the profits are shared out over the entire value chain there remain only very small margins for those involved. This is especially true of the original producers who often see little use in spending time making recorded music owing to the poor domestic incentive structure. Interviews showed that the lack of sufficient incentives to record music means that today's artistes öwho tend to have a`get rich quick' attitude to the businessöconcentrate their efforts on live performance (a live performance brings in, depending on their status, between US2000 and US$15 000 for an artiste). This further focuses the majority of the industry on the domestic market and accentuates the cycle of lack of investment and ability to produce product exportable on competitive terms.
Although the domestic market may in terms of cash be relatively impoverished it is one that is dominated and driven by highly`sophisticated consumers' who are crucial to the innovation and creative dynamism of the industry. Whilst many things go very slowly in Jamaica, others go very quickly and this can be seen to be especially true of music trends and fashions in Kingston. Successful sounds and riddims are copied almost instantly and it is not atypical for a sound or stylistic innovation to be totally overexploited and out of date within a few weeks. The speed of production and release coupled with the speed at which consumer fashions change puts an enormous pressure on even the most-established artistes constantly to come up with new sounds to satisfy audiences. A fragmented and sole-trader-dominated retail and distribution system serves the recorded-music needs of the consumers. The intense competition amongst the highly flexible and adaptable distributors and retailers (many often act as both) ensures that the products get to market, often direct from the studio, at breakneck speeds. On the other hand, fragmentation makes marketing and distribution economies of scale hard to achieve, limits reinvestment opportunities, and makes it much easier for pirates and gangsters to be`involved' in the value chain.
The figures on the value of recorded-music exports from the country quoted in the introduction and indicators such as the level of investment and upgrading underline that, although Jamaica has the demonstrated potential to give rise to music products with a large global commercial appeal, the local production system benefits very little from this competitiveness. The export figure of US$291 000 for 1994 of course underrepresents the earnings from music products that reach the island öthere are also the limited amount of royalties that do make it back; the`invisible' exports of pirate exporters; personal monies brought home by those stars that visit home on a regular basis. Many also consider musical success to have had a direct effect on the success of the island's tourist industry. Nonetheless it is obvious when compared with the likes of Stockholm that Kingston is reaping extremely meagre benefits from its globally competitive position in music.
The problem of small returns to high levels of musical creativity in the country's music industry is widely recognised as being in large part a result of the lack of an adequate intellectual-property-protection regime in the country and the lack of effective enforcement of existing legislation and international protocols (compare Bourne and Allgrove, 1995; Kozul-Wright and Stanbury, 1998) . On an international level the music industry in general has serious problems in enforcing statutory claims to usage and remuneration from individually held intellectual property rights (IFPI, 2001b; Wallis et al, 1999) . Recent agreements under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT), and the European Union have further extended the scope and force of copyright protection and therein further favoured the global majors'`ownership' of revenues from the majority of artistes' output and existing copyrighted material (compare Galperin, 1999; Taylor and Towse, 1998; Wallis et al, 1999) . In most countries an array of collecting societies or industry organisations oversee copyright enforcement and collect and distribute revenues. The fragmented firm structure, lack of direct links with the majors, and underdeveloped nature of performers' organisations and industry representatives have made it especially hard for Jamaica to enforce existing copyrights internationally and collect revenues. There is a lack of effective industry-wide organisations or supporting institutions, though organisations do existösuch as the Jamaican Federation of Musicians and Affiliated Artistes and the Jamaican Association of Composers, Authors and Publishersöand are working to improve matters. Coupled with the fragmentation of the industry's firm structure, this lack has meant the industry has little coherent voice in the island's policy or legal circles. This lack of voice and the traditional fear, often hostility, the establishment has had of some of the industry's actors in large part explains why it is that the Jamaican government has only recently begun to recognise officially the industry's economic significance and potential (OPM, 1996) and attempt to develop a more effective copyright environment. An example of this is that it was not until 1993 that the island's copyright law was updated to an international standard. Although Jamaica has legislation and is now a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), protection is limited by the fact that an effective national collection agency does not exist: it is through reciprocal arrangements with other national collection agencies that rights are most effectively enforced and royalties collected.
An important part of the intellectual-property environment in Kingston is industry specific, and culturally related to the underground nature of musical creation, propagation, and commercial adaptation. Interviewees frequently referred to the existence of a predominant`hustler mentality' in the industry:`p iracy is the time-honoured tradition. In dancehall, the rhythm is king: lyrics and melodiesönot to mention singers, royalties, DJs and copyrightsöare afterthoughts'' (Vibe September 1992, page 78; cited in Stephens, 1998, page 162) . As Gilroy (1987, page 164) notes, the focus of modern Jamaican dancehall culture is not the cult of personality that drives the commodification and value chains of popular music but rather the blending and creative appropriation of others' music. Interviews further revealed that this lax attitude to musical ownership and property rights, by the standards of copyrighters, was not only a part of the current general cultural norms that operate in the Kingston scene but had also often been part of the religious beliefs that many of the Rastafarian predecessors to dancehall and the like thought of as central to musical expression. Indeed the problems many artistes and firms have had with copyrights (particularly with pre-1980s recordings and compositions) can be related to Rastafarian antiproperty attitudes. The most obvious sign perhaps of this antiproperty attitude is the infrequency with which reggae stars have, or have left, wills and wellmanaged intellectual-property portfolios, most notably the case of Bob Marley who failed to leave a will. This sort of view of intellectual property is far removed from the view that prevails in the global industry. However, it must be noted that even for the early Rasta artistes and producers Rastafarian beliefs did not always extend beyond the lyric sheet. Moreover, it would be wrong to say that most Kingston artistes and industry actors (or indeed the families left by many dead Rastafarian reggae stars) share the antiproperty views of the Rastafarians commonly associated with Kingston in Western minds. Recent generations of industry actors, often heavily influenced by US rap and hip-hop culture and role models, are most often highly motivated by the lure of financial rewards and are overwhelmingly in favour of the international model of musical production and copyright as it tends to secure much higher rewards for them. Lack of an effective system for collecting and protecting rights revenues has been an important, though not the only, factor in the rapid relocation of nearly all recent stars to other countries (in particular to the United States). Culture has therefore had an influence on certain actors' approaches to the issue of copyright but it would be very wrong to say that such cultural or religious attitudes are relevant to today's Jamaican music industry or that such attitudes explain the lack of a functioning IPR regime.
In conclusion, Kingston has functioned as a world-class innovation centre or creative milieu driven by a fragmented industrial structure that is highly competitive and embedded in a dense interactive and transactional social mode of production. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons most of the value chain is outside the city and country and the industry faces serious problems in retaining profits and securing the investment necessary to improve its export potential.
Conclusion
It appears from these two different examples of successful music-production centres that geographic proximity based on agglomeration in urban areas fosters intensified transactions and interactions that are crucial to commercially successful creative and innovative product development. With this paper, then, we hope to make a small contribution to reaffirming the often-noted positive correlation between agglomeration and economic and creative innovation. It is important, however, to stress that rates of return to agglomerated economic activity and innovation vary considerably because of a variety of factors. The most crucial factors in the case of the music industry are the nature of firm-level linkages between global and local actors, and the effectiveness of the IPR environment creativity is generated within. It seems that the particular organisational mix and structure found in a centre of creativity may link directly with the IPR regime it is embedded within. Kingston can be seen in some ways as a model for what happens to the structure and modus operandi of a music industry if an effective IPR regime does not exist. Stockholm, in contrast, is an example of the profitable effects of being fully integrated into the mainstream global IPR regime and associated industry configurations. The two cases demonstrate that, first, different positions within the present global political economy affect the ability of music economies to protect IPRs, and thus their ability to allow investments in creativity to be returned. Second, they demonstrate that if in the future the ability to exploit copyrights commercially gets significantly eroded (through for instance technological change) the institutions of the music industry may well reconfigure or fragment along the lines of places such as Kingston.
The main focus of the study has been the ways in which internationally competitive product development links to the fullest possible returns on innovation for the production centre and its industrial system and actors. In this area it has been shown that the two centres profit from their production at considerably different rates. On the face of it the simple lesson to be learnt from these two cases seems to be that higher degrees of firm-level integration into the wider global music industry confers major competitive advantages to a city's, or a small nation's, music industry and the proportion of profits that return or remain in the centre. Strong and institutionalised vertical intrafirm and interfirm linkages to the global market have in the case of Stockholm had the effect of bringing Swedish products to global markets in a manner in which intellectual property is, as far as possible, protected. Furthermore, exposure to the global has been crucial to the development of an extensive network or production and postproduction services and firms which have had benefits both for domestic artistes and for export earnings. In contrast Kingston has remained largely outside the global music industry and the effective international copyright regime, leaving it vulnerable in the past to exploitation both by the majors and by unscrupulous homegrown criminals. We should, however, be careful not to neglect the fact that in both cases, and in particular in the case of Kingston, some observers have suggested a degree of separation and autonomy from global circuits may have been important in supporting a diverse and creative domestic music scene and related corporate structure. Many Western music fans romanticise the creative scenes associated with chaotic and unregulated industries such as that in Kingston. Neglecting the fact that Jamaican musical products have long been internationalised and commodified, such people have suggested to us that greater internationalisation and commodification of local culture for international consumption will suck the vitality and lifeblood out of the local scene: in short do not tamper with something which has produced such great music. However, evidence from highly commodified and internationalised music scenesösuch as New York, Los Angeles, London, Stockholm, Nashville, etcödemonstrates that this need not be so (compare Scott, 1999a) . Commercial success can sit very well with, and indeed encourage, musical creativity and can also provide financial rewards that places like Jamaica sorely need. It is in reality hard to romanticise or excuse the appalling and oppressive poverty, crime, and violence of the`scene' in Kingston.
In conclusion, it seems from these cases that the stronger the firm-level and institutional links between localised industry actors and multinational corporations and the better the integration of the country into international IPR regimes, the higher the rate of return (both financially and in terms of technical and innovation resources) to the local production centre. If one were to think these cases worthy of generalisation then it would seem that in the case of the music industry the spreading influence of the global majors should not necessarily be seen as the equivalent of the spread of cultural imperialism and centralised commercial exploitation as is so often the case. The majors are powerful actors in laying the ground for and financing not only musical products but the IPR issues surrounding them. In the case of these two production centres a complex set of relations between local and global scales exists and processes of linking the scales offer very real positive, as well as negative, possibilities for creativity, competitiveness, and profitability. Furthermore, although we have concentrated on the music industry in this paper, it is worth noting that the findings presented here could have implications for other`cultural-products' industries, including, for example, design, film, fashion, and media. Many of these industries share with the music industry a reliance on the effectiveness of IPR mediated through internationalised and corporatised value chains in order to get a substantial share of the profits back home'. It is our viewpoint then that, as with the music industry, it is not only the quality of the creative milieux that leads to commercial success in cultural-products industries but also the links between the local production system and international circuits of capital, distribution, and effective property rights. The rapid growth in the sizes and profitability of markets for these types of products in recent years points to the fact that these sectors may be of great help in economic development, and for smaller open economies with a proven track record of cultural-product innovation the competitive position and rate of return in these industries must be carefully examined and supported by both the private and public sectors.
